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Abstract
We develop a framework for computing the total valuation adjustment (XVA) of a European
claim accounting for funding costs, counterparty credit risk, and collateralization. Based on no-
arbitrage arguments, we derive nonlinear backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) as-
sociated with the replicating portfolios of long and short positions in the claim. This leads to the
definition of buyer’s and seller’s XVA, which in turn identify a no-arbitrage interval. In the case
that borrowing and lending rates coincide, we provide a fully explicit expression for the uniquely
determined XVA, expressed as a percentage of the price of the traded claim, and for the corre-
sponding replication strategies. This extends the result of Piterbarg (2010) by incorporating the
effect of premature contract termination due to default risk of the trader and of his counterparty.
Keywords: XVA, counterparty credit risk, funding spreads, backward stochastic differential
equations, arbitrage-free pricing.
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1 Introduction
When managing a portfolio, a trader needs to raise cash in order to finance a number of operations.
Those include maintaining the hedge of the position, posting collateral resources, and paying interest
on collateral received. Moreover, the trader needs to account for the possibility that the position may
be liquidated prematurely due to his own or counterparty’s default, hence entailing additional costs
due to the closeout procedure. Cash resources are provided to the trader by his treasury desk, and
must be remunerated. If he is borrowing, then he will be charged an interest rate depending on current
market conditions as well as on his own credit quality. Such a rate is usually higher than the lending
rate at which the trader would lend excess cash proceeds from his investment strategy to the treasury.
The difference between borrowing and lending rate is also referred to as funding spread.
∗The paper Bichuch et al. (2016) subsumes the present working paper as well as Bichuch et al. (2015).
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Even though pricing by replication can still be put to work under this rate asymmetry, the classical
Black-Scholes formula no longer yields the price of the claim. In the absence of default risk, few
studies have been devoted to pricing and hedging claims in markets with differential rates. Korn
(1995) considers option pricing in a market with a higher borrowing than lending rate, and derives an
interval of acceptable prices for both the buyer and the seller. Cvitanić and Karatzas (1993) consider
the problem of hedging contingent claims under portfolio constraints allowing for a higher borrowing
than lending rate. El Karoui et al. (1997) study the super-hedging price of a contingent claim under
rate asymmetry via nonlinear backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs).
The above studies do not consider the impact of counterparty credit risk on valuation and hedging
of the derivative security. The new set of rules mandated by the Basel Committee (Basel III (2010))
to govern bilateral trading in OTC markets requires to take into account default and funding costs
when marking to market derivatives positions. This has originated a growing stream of literature,
some of which is surveyed next. Crépey (2015a) and Crépey (2015b) introduce a BSDE approach
for the valuation of counterparty credit risk taking funding constraints into account. He decomposes
the value of the transaction into three separate components, the collateral, the hedging assets used to
hedge market risk of the portfolio as well as counterparty credit risk, and the funding assets needed
to finance the hedging strategy. An accompanying numerical study was conducted in Crépey et al.
(2012). Along similar lines, Brigo and Pallavicini (2014) first derive a risk-neutral pricing formula
for a contract taking into account counterparty credit risk, funding, and collateral servicing costs,
and then provide the corresponding BSDE representation. Piterbarg (2010) derives a closed form
solution for the price of a derivative contract in presence of funding costs and collateralization, but
ignores the possibility of counterparty’s default. Moreover, he assumes that borrowing and lending
rates are equal, an assumption that is later relaxed by Mercurio (2015). Burgard and Kjaer (2011a)
and Burgard and Kjaer (2011b) generalize Piterbarg (2010)’s model to include default risk of the
trader and of his counterparty. They derive PDE representations for the price of the derivative via
a replication approach, assuming the absence of arbitrage and sufficient smoothness of the derivative
price. Bielecki and Rutkowski (2014) develop a general semimartingale market framework and derive
the BSDE representation of the wealth process associated with a self-financing trading strategy that
replicates a default-free claim. As in Piterbarg (2010) they do not take counterparty credit risk into
account. Bielecki and Rutkowski (2014) consider the viewpoint of the hedger, but do not derive
arbitrage bounds for unilateral prices. These are instead analyzed in Nie and Rutkowski (2013), who
also examine the existence of fair bilateral prices. A good overview of the current literature is given
in Crépey et al. (2014).
In the present article we introduce a valuation framework which allows us to quantify the total
valuation adjustment, abbreviated as XVA, of a European type claim. We consider an underlying
portfolio consisting of a default-free stock and two risky bonds underwritten by the trader’s firm and
his counterparty. Stock purchases and sales are financed through the security lending market. We
allow for asymmetry between treasury borrowing and lending rates, repo lending and borrowing rates,
as well as between interest rates paid by the collateral taker and received by the collateral provider.
We derive the nonlinear BSDEs associated with the portfolios replicating long and short positions
in the traded claim, taking into account counterparty credit risk and closeout payoffs exchanged at
default. This extends, in our specific setting, the general semi-martingale framework introduced by
Bielecki and Rutkowski (2014) by including counterparty default risk. Due to rate asymmetries,
the BSDE which represents the valuation process of the portfolio replicating a long position in the
claim cannot be directly obtained (via a sign change) from the one replicating a short position. More
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specifically, there is a no-arbitrage interval which can be defined in terms of the buyer’s and the seller’s
XVA.
When borrowing and lending rates are the same, buyer’s and seller’s XVA coincide, and we can
develop a fully explicit expression which precisely identifies the contributions from funding costs, credit
valuation adjustment (CVA), and debit valuation adjustment (DVA). Moreover, we can express the
total valuation adjustment as a percentage of the publicly available price of the claim. This gives
an interpretation of the XVA in terms of the cost of a trade, and has risk management implications
because it pushes banks to attempt to reduce their borrowing costs in addition to choosing trades that
minimize funding costs.
We consider two different specializations of our framework. The first recovers the framework put
forward by Piterbarg (2010). Here, we also give the exact expression for the number of shares associated
with the replicating strategy of the investor. The latter is shown to consist of two components. The
first is a funding adjusted delta hedging strategy, and the second is a correction based on the gap
between funding and collateral rates. The second specialization is an extension of Piterbarg (2010)’s
model, which also incorporates the possibility of counterparty credit risk and hence includes trader and
counterparty bonds into the portfolio of replicating securities. By means of cumbersome computations,
we provide an explicit decomposition of XVA into three main components: funding adjusted price of
the transaction exclusive of collateral and default costs, funding adjusted closeout payments, and
funding costs of the collateralization procedure.
The paper is organized as follows. We develop the model in Section 2 and introduce replicated
claim and collateral process in Section 3. We analyze arbitrage-free pricing of XVA in Section 4,
and show that credit valuation adjustments can be recovered as special cases of our general formula.
Section 5 develops an explicit expression for the XVA under equal borrowing and lending rates. Section
6 concludes the paper. Some proofs of technical results are delegated to the Appendix A.
2 The model
We consider a probability space (Ω,G,P) rich enough to support all subsequent constructions. Here, P
denotes the physical probability measure. Throughout the paper, we refer to “I” as the investor, trader
or hedger interested in computing the total valuation adjustment, and to “C” as the counterparty
to the investor in the transaction. The background or reference filtration that includes all market
information except for default events and augmented by all (G,P)-nullsets, is denoted by F := (Ft)t≥0.
The filtration containing default event information is denoted by H := (Ht)t≥0. Both filtrations will
be specified in the sequel of the paper. We denote by G := (Gt)t≥0 the enlarged filtration given by
Gt := Ft ∨ Ht, augmented by its nullsets. Note that because of the augmentation of F by nullsets,
the filtration (Gt) satisfies the usual conditions of completeness and right continuity; see Section 2.4
of Bélanger et al. (2004).
We distinguish between universal instruments, and investor specific instruments, depending on
whether their valuation is public or private. Private valuations are based on discount rates, which de-
pend on investor specific characteristics, while public valuations depend on publicly available discount
factors. Throughout the paper, we will use the superscript ∧ when referring specifically to public
valuations. Section 2.1 introduces the universal securities. Investor specific securities are introduced
in Section 2.2.
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2.1 Universal instruments
This class includes the default-free stock security on which the financial claim is written, and the
security account used to support purchases or sales of the stock security. Moreover, it includes the
risky bond issued by the trader as well as the one issued by his counterparty.
The stock security. We let F := (Ft)t≥0 be the (G,P)-augmentation of the filtration generated by
a standard Brownian motion W P under the measure P. Under the physical measure, the dynamics of
the stock price is given by
dSt = µSt dt+ σSt dW Pt ,
where µ and σ are constants denoting, respectively, the appreciation rate and the volatility of the
stock.
The security account. Borrowing and lending activities related to the stock security happen
through the security lending or repo market. We do not distinguish between security lending and
repo, but refer to all of them as repo transactions. We consider two types of repo transactions: se-
curity driven and cash driven, see also Adrian et al. (2013). The security driven transaction is used
to overcome the prohibition on “naked” short sales of stocks, that is the prohibition to the trader of
selling a stock which he does not hold and hence cannot deliver. The repo market helps to overcome
this by allowing the trader to lend cash to the participants in the repo market who would post the
stock as a collateral to the trader. The trader would later return the stock collateral in exchange
of a pre-specified amount, usually slightly higher than the original loan amount. Hence, effectively
this collateralized loan has a rate, referred to as the repo rate. The cash lender can sell the stock on
an exchange, and later, at the maturity of the repo contract, buy it back and return it to the cash
borrower. We illustrate the mechanics of the security driven transaction in Figure 1.
The other type of transaction is cash driven. This is essentially the other side of the trade, and is
implemented when the trader wants a long position in the stock security. In this case, he borrows cash
from the repo market, uses it to purchase the stock security posted as collateral to the loan, and agrees
to repurchase the collateral later at a slightly higher price. The difference between the original price
of the collateral and the repurchase price defines the repo rate. As the loan is collateralized, the repo
rate will be lower than the rate of an uncollateralized loan. At maturity of the repo contract, when
the trader has repurchased the stock collateral from the repo market, he can sell it on the exchange.
The details of the cash driven transaction are summarized in Figure 2.
We use r+r to denote the rate charged by the hedger when he lends money to the repo market
and implements his short-selling position. We use r−r to denote the rate that he is charged when he
borrows money from the repo market and implements a long position. We denote by Br+r and Br−r
the repo accounts whose drifts are given, respectively, by r+r and r−r . Their dynamics are given by
dBr
±
r
t = r±r B
r±r
t dt.
For future purposes, define
Brrt := Brrt
(
ψr
)
= e
∫ t
0 rr(ψ
r
s)ds, (1)
where
rr(x) = r−r 1l{x<0} + r+r 1l{x>0}. (2)
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Figure 1: Security driven repo activity: Solid lines are purchases/sales, dashed lines borrowing/lending,
dotted lines interest due; blue lines are cash, red lines are stock. The treasury desk lends money to
the trader (1) who uses it to lend to the repo market (2) receiving in turn collateral (3). He sells the
stock on the market to get effectively into a short position (4) earning cash from the deal (5) which
he uses to repay his debt to the funding desk (6). As a cash lender, he receives interest at the rate
r+r from the repo market. There are no interest payments between trader and treasury desk as the
payments (1) and (6) cancel each other out.
Here, ψrt denotes the number of shares of the repo account held at time t. Equations (1)-(2) indicate
that the trader earns the rate r+r when lending ψr > 0 shares of the repo account to implement the
short-selling of −ϑ shares of the stock security, i.e., ϑ < 0. Similarly, he has to pay interest rate r−r
on the −ψr (ψr < 0) shares of the repo account that he has borrowed by posting ϑ > 0 shares of
the stock security as collateral. Because borrowing and lending transactions are fully collateralized, it
always holds that
ψrtB
rr
t = −ξtSt. (3)
The risky bond securities. Let τi, i ∈ {I, C}, be the default times of trader and counterparty.
These default times are assumed to be independent exponentially distributed random variables with
constant intensities hPi , i ∈ {I, C}. We use Hi(t) = 1l{τi≤t}, t ≥ 0, to denote the default indicator
process of i. The default event filtration is given by Ht = σ(HIu, HCu ;u ≤ t). Such a default model
is a special case of the bivariate Cox process framework, for which the (H)-hypothesis (see Elliott et
al. (2000)) is well known to hold. In particular, this implies that the F-Brownian motion W P is also
a G-Brownian motion.
We introduce two risky bond securities underwritten by the trader I and by his counterparty C,
and maturing at the same time T . We denote their price processes by P I and PC , respectively. For
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Figure 2: Cash driven repo activity: Solid lines are purchases/sales, dashed lines borrowing/lending,
dotted lines interest due; blue lines are cash, red lines are stock. The treasury desk lends money to the
trader (1) who uses it to purchase stock (2) from the stock market (3). He uses the stock as collateral
(4) to borrow money from the repo market (5) and uses it to repay his debt to the funding desk (6).
The trader has thus to pay interest at the rate r−r to the repo market. There are no interest payments
between trader and treasury desk as the payments (1) and (6) cancel each other out.
0 ≤ t ≤ T , i ∈ {I, C}, the dynamics of their price processes are given by
dP it = (ri + hPi )P it dt− P it− dH it , P i0 = e−(r
i+hPi )T , (4)
with return rates ri + hPi , i ∈ {I, C}. We do not allow bonds to be traded in the repo market. Our
assumption is driven by the consideration that the repurchase agreement market for risky bonds is
often illiquid. We also refer to the introductory discussion in Blanco et al. (2005) stating that even if
a bond can be shorted on the repo market, the tenor of the agreement is usually very short.
Throughout the paper, we use τ := τI ∧ τC ∧ T to denote the earliest of the transaction maturity
T , trader and counterparty default time.
2.2 Hedger specific instruments
This class includes the funding account and the collateral account of the hedger.
Funding account. We assume that the trader lends and borrows moneys from his treasury at
possibly different rates. Denote by r+f the rate at which the hedger lends to the treasury, and by r
−
f
the rate at which he borrows from it. We denote by Br
±
f the cash accounts corresponding to these
funding rates, whose dynamics are given by
dB
r±
f
t = r±f B
r±
f
t dt.
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Let ξft the number of shares of the funding account at time t. Define
B
rf
t := B
rf
t
(
ξf ) = e
∫ t
0 rf (ξ
f
s )ds, (5)
where
rf := rf (y) = r−f 1l{y<0} + r
+
f 1l{y>0}. (6)
Equations (5) - (6) indicate that if the hedger’s position at time t, ξft , is negative, then he needs to
finance his position. He will do so by borrowing from the treasury at the rate r−f . Similarly, if the
hedger’s position is positive, he will lend the cash amount to the treasury at the rate r+f .
Collateral process and collateral account. The role of the collateral is to mitigate counterparty
exposure of the two parties, i.e the potential loss on the transacted claim incurred by one party if
the other defaults. The collateral process C := (Ct; t ≥ 0) is an F adapted process. We use the
following sign conventions. If Ct > 0, the hedger is said to be the collateral provider. In this case the
counterparty measures a positive exposure to the hedger, hence asking him to post collateral so as to
absorb potential losses arising if the hedger defaults. Vice versa, if Ct < 0, the hedger is said to be
the collateral taker, i.e., he measures a positive exposure to the counterparty and hence asks her to
post collateral.
Collateral is posted and received in the form of cash in line with data reported by ISDA (2014),
according to which cash collateral is the most popular form of collateral.1
We denote by r+c the rate on the collateral amount received by the hedger if he has posted the
collateral, i.e., if he is the collateral provider, while r−c is the rate paid by the hedger if he has received
the collateral, i.e., if he is the collateral taker. The rates r±c typically correspond to Fed Funds or
EONIA rates, i.e., to the contractual rates earned by cash collateral in the US and EURO markets,
respectively. We denote by Br±c the cash accounts corresponding to these collateral rates, whose
dynamics are given by
dBr
±
c
t = r±c B
r±c
t dt.
Moreover, let us define
Brct := Brct (C) = e
∫ t
0 rc(Cs)ds,
where
rc(x) = r+c 1l{x>0} + r−c 1l{x<0}.
Let ψct be the number of shares of the collateral account Brct held by the trader at time t. Then it
must hold that
ψctB
rc
t = −Ct. (7)
The latter relation means that if the trader is the collateral taker at t, i.e., Ct < 0, then he has
purchased shares of the collateral account i.e., ψct > 0. Vice versa, if the trader is the collateral
provider at time t, i.e., Ct > 0, then he has sold shares of the collateral account to her counterparty.
Before proceeding further, we visualize in Figure 3 the mechanics governing the entire flow of
transactions taking place.
1According to ISDA (2014) (see Table 3 therein), cash represents slightly more than 78% of the total collateral
delivered and these figures are broadly consistent across years. Government securities instead only constitute 18% of
total collateral delivered and other forms of collateral consisting of riskier assets, such as municipal bonds, corporate
bonds, equity or commodities only represent a fraction slightly higher than 3%.
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Figure 3: Trading: Solid lines are purchases/sales, dashed lines borrowing/lending, dotted lines interest
due; blue lines are cash, red lines are stock purchases for cash and black lines are bond purchases for
cash.
3 Replicated claim, close-out value and wealth process
We take the viewpoint of a trader who wants to replicate a European type claim on the stock security.
Such a claim is purchased or sold by the trader from/to his counterparty over-the-counter and hence
subject to counterparty credit risk. The closeout value of the claim is decided by a valuation agent who
might either be one of the parties or a third party, in accordance with market practices as reviewed
by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). The valuation agent determines the
closeout value of the transaction by calculating the Black Scholes price of the derivative using the
discount rate rD. Such a (publicly available) discount rate enables the hedger to introduce a valuation
measure Q defined by the property that all securities have instantaneous growth rate rD under this
measure. The rest of the section is organized as follows. We give the details of the valuation measure
in Section 3.1, give the price process of the claim to be replicated and the collateral process in Section
3.2, and define the closeout procedure in Section 3.3. We define the class of admissible strategies in
Section 3.4.
3.1 The valuation measure
We first introduce the default intensity model. Under the physical measure P, default times of trader
and counterparty are assumed to be independent exponentially distributed random variables with
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constant intensities hPi , i ∈ {I, C}. It then holds that for each i ∈ {I, C}
$i,Pt := H it −
∫ t
0
(
1−H iu
)
hPi du
is a (G,P)-martingale. The valuation measure Q chosen by the third party is equivalent to P and is
given by the Radon-Nikodým density
dQ
dP
∣∣∣∣
Gτ
= e
rD−µ
σ
W Pτ− (rD−µ)
2
2σ2 τ
(
1 + r
I − rD
hPI
)HIτ
e(rD−r
I)τ
(
1 + r
C − rD
hPC
)HCτ
e(rD−r
C)τ , (8)
where rD is the discount rate that the third party uses for valuation. We also recall that rI and
rC denote the rate of returns of the bonds underwritten by the trader and counterparty respectively.
Under Q, the dynamics of the risky assets are given by
dSt = rDSt dt+ σSt dWQt ,
dP It = rDP It dt− P It−d$I,Qt ,
dPCt = rDPCt dt− PCt−d$C,Qt
where WQ := (WQt ; 0 ≤ t ≤ τ) is a Q-Brownian motion, while $I,Q := ($I,Qt ; 0 ≤ t ≤ τ) and
$C,Q := ($C,Qt ; 0 ≤ t ≤ τ) are Q-martingales. The above dynamics of P It and PCt under the valuation
measure Q can be deduced from their respective price processes given in (4) via a straightforward
application of Itô’s formula.
By application of Girsanov’s theorem, we have the following relations: WQt = W Pt + µ−rDσ t, $
i,Q
t =
$i,Pt +
∫ t
0
(
1−H iu
)
(hPi − hQi )du. Here, for i ∈ {I, C}, hQi = ri − rD + hPi is the default intensity of the
name i under the valuation measure, which is assumed to be positive.
3.2 Replicated claim and collateral specification
The price process of the claim ϑ to be replicated is, according to the third party’s valuation, given by
Vˆ (t, St) = e−rD(T−t)EQ
[
Φ(ST )
∣∣Ft],
where Φ : R>0 → R is a real valued function representing the terminal payoff of the claim. We will
require that Φ is piecewise continuously differentiable and of at most polynomial growth. Additionally,
the hedger has to post collateral for the claim. As opposed to the collateral used in the repo agreement,
which is always the stock, the collateral mitigating counterparty credit risk of the claim is always cash.
The collateral is chosen to be a fraction of the current exposure process of one party to the other.
In case when the hedger sells a European call or put option on the security to his counterparty (he
would then need to replicate the payoff Φ(ST ) which he needs to give to the counterparty at T ),
then the counterparty always measures a positive exposure to the hedger, while the hedger has zero
exposure to the counterparty. As a result, the trader will always be the collateral provider, while the
counterparty the collateral taker. By a symmetric reasoning, if the hedger buys a European call or put
option from his counterparty (he would then replicate the payoff −Φ(ST ) received at maturity from
his counterparty), then he will always be the collateral taker. On the event that neither the trader
nor the counterparty have defaulted by time t, the collateral process is defined by
Ct = αVˆ (t, St), (9)
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where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is the collateralization level. The case when α = 0 corresponds to zero collateraliza-
tion, α = 1 gives full collateralization. Collateralization levels are industry specific and are reported
on a quarterly basis by ISDA, see for instance ISDA (2011) , Table 3.3. therein.2
3.3 Close-out value of transaction
The ISDA market review of OTC derivative collateralization practices, see ISDA (2010), section 2.1.5,
states that the surviving party should evaluate the transactions just terminated due to the default
event, and claim for a reimbursement only after mitigating losses with the available collateral. In our
study, we follow the risk-free closeout convention meaning that the trader liquidates his position at the
counterparty default time at the market value. Next, we describe how we model it in our framework.
Denote by θτ the price of the hedging portfolio at τ , where we recall that τ has been defined in Section
2. The value of the portfolio depends on the value of the collateral account and on the residual value
of the claim being traded at default. This term originates the well known credit and debit valuation
adjustments terms. For a real number x, we use the notations x+ := max(x, 0), and x− := max(0,−x).
Then, we have the following expression
θτ (Vˆ ) = θτ (C, Vˆ )
:= Vˆ (τ, Sτ ) + 1l{τC<τI}LC
(
Vˆ (τ, Sτ )− Cτ−
)− − 1l{τI<τC}LI(Vˆ (τ, Sτ )− Cτ−)+
= min
(
(1− LI)
(
Vˆ (τ, Sτ )− Cτ−
)
+ Cτ− , Vˆ (τ, Sτ )
)
1l{τI<τC}
+ max
(
(1− LC)
(
Vˆ (τ, Sτ )− Cτ−
)
+ Cτ− , Vˆ (τ, Sτ )
)
1l{τC<τI} (10)
=
(
1− (1− α)LI
)
Vˆ (τ, Sτ )1l{τI<τC ;Vˆ (τI ,SτI )≥0} + Vˆ (τ, Sτ )1l{τI<τC ;Vˆ (τI ,SτI )<0}
+
(
1− (1− α)LC
)
Vˆ (τ, Sτ )1l{τC<τI ;Vˆ (τC ,SτC )<0}} + Vˆ (τ, Sτ )1l{τC<τI ;Vˆ (τC ,SτC )≥0}
where 1l{τC<τI}LC
(
Vˆ (τ, Sτ )−Cτ−
)− originates the residual CVA type term after collateral mitigation,
while 1l{τI<τC}LI
(
Vˆ (τ, Sτ )− Cτ−
)+ originates the DVA type term. Here 0 ≤ LI ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ LC ≤ 1
are the loss rates against the trader and counterparty claims, respectively.
Remark 3.1. We present two specific cases to better explain the mechanics of the close-out. Recall
that we have assumed that the collateralization level 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
• The trader sold a call option to the counterparty (hence Vˆ (t, St) > 0 for all t). This means
that in each time t the trader is the collateral provider, Ct = αVˆ (t, St) > 0, given that the
counterparty always measures a positive exposure to the trader.
– The counterparty defaults first and before the maturity of the claim. Then the trader will
net the amount Vˆ (τ, Sτ ) owed to the counterparty with his collateral provided to the coun-
terparty, and only return to her the residual amount Vˆ (τ, Sτ )−Cτ−. As a result, we expect
his trading strategy (exclusive of collateral) to replicate this amount. We next verify that
this is the case. Using the above expression of closeout wealth (which is inclusive of col-
lateral) we obtain θτ (Vˆ ) = Vˆ (τ, Sτ ). Hence, his closeout amount exclusive of collateral is
Vˆ (τ, Sτ )− Cτ− coinciding with the amount which he must give to the counterparty.
2The average collateralization level in 2010 across all OTC derivatives was 73.1%. Positions with banks and broker
dealers are the most highly collateralized among the different counterparty types with levels around 88.6%. Expo-
sures to non-financial corporations and sovereign governments and supra-national institutions tend to have the lowest
collateralization levels, amounting to 13.9%.
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– The trader defaults first and before the maturity of the claim. Then the counterparty will
only get a recovery fraction (1−LI)
(
Vˆ (τ, Sτ )−Cτ−
)
from the trader. As a result, we expect
the strategy of the trader (exclusive of collateral) to replicate this amount. Next, we verify
that this is the case. Using the above expression of closeout wealth (inclusive of collateral)
we obtain θτ (Vˆ ) = Vˆ (τ, Sτ )−LI(Vˆ (τ, Sτ )−Cτ−). Hence, his closeout amount exclusive of
collateral is (1 − LI)
(
Vˆ (τ, Sτ ) − Cτ−
)
coinciding with the amount which must be returned
to the counterparty.
• The trader purchased a call option from the counterparty (hence Vˆ (t, St) < 0 for all t). This
means that in each time t the trader is the collateral taker, Ct = αVˆ (t, St) < 0, given that the
trader always measures a positive exposure to the counterparty.
– The trader defaults first and before the maturity of the claim. Then the counterparty will net
the amount −Vˆ (τ, Sτ ) which she should return to the trader with the collateral held by the
trader, and only return to him the residual amount −(Vˆ (τ, Sτ )−Cτ−). This means that the
wealth process of the trader exclusive of collateral at τI should be equal to Vˆ (τ, Sτ )−Cτ−).
We next verify that this is the case. Using the above expression of closeout wealth (which is
inclusive of collateral) we obtain θτ (Vˆ ) = Vˆ (τ, Sτ ). Hence, the closeout amount exclusive
of collateral is Vˆ (τ, Sτ )− Cτ− coinciding with the above wealth process.
– The counterparty defaults first and before the maturity of the claim. Then the trader will
only get a recovery fraction −(1−LC)
(
Vˆ (τ, Sτ )−Cτ−
)
from the counterparty. As a result,
we expect the wealth process of the trader (exclusive of collateral) at τI to be equal to (1−
LC)
(
Vˆ (τ, Sτ ) − Cτ−
)
. Next, we verify that this is the case. Using the above expression of
closeout wealth (inclusive of collateral) we obtain θτ (Vˆ ) = Vˆ (τ, Sτ )−LC((Vˆ (τ, Sτ )−Cτ−)).
Hence, the closeout payout exclusive of collateral is (1 − LC)
(
Vˆ (τ, Sτ ) − Cτ−
)
coinciding
with the above mentioned wealth process.
3.4 The wealth process
We allow for collateral to be fully rehypothecated. This means that the collateral taker is granted an
unrestricted right to use the collateral amount, i.e. he can use it to purchase investment securities.
This is in agreement with most ISDA annexes, including the New York Annex, English Annex, and
Japanese Annex. We notice that for the case of cash collateral, the percentage of re-hypotheticated
collateral amounts to about 90% (see Table 8 in ISDA (2014)) hence largely supporting our assumption
of full collateral re-hypothecation. As in Bielecki and Rutkowski (2014), the collateral received can
be seen as an ordinary component of a hedger’s trading strategy, although this applies only prior
to the counterparty’s default. We denote by Vt(ϕ) the legal wealth process of the hedger, and use
V Ct (ϕ) to denote the actual wealth process. In other words, we have V Ct (ϕ) = Vt(ϕ) − Ct, where
we recall that Ct < 0 indicates that the hedger is the collateral taker. This reflects the fact that the
collateral remains legally in the hands of the provider whereas it can actually be used by the taker
(via rehypothecation) and invested in the risky assets.
Let ϕ :=
(
ξt, ξ
f
t , ξ
I
t , ξ
C
t t ≥ 0
)
. Here, we recall that ξ denotes the number of shares of the security,
and ξf the number of shares in the funding account. Moreover, ξI and ξC are the number of shares
of trader and counterparty risky bonds, respectively. Recalling Eq. (7), and expressing all positions
in terms of number of shares multiplied by the price of the corresponding security, the wealth process
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V (ϕ) is given by the following expression
Vt(ϕ) := ξtSt + ξIt P It + ξCt PCt + ξ
f
t B
rf
t + ψtBrrt − ψctBrct , (11)
where we notice that the number of shares ψ of the repo account and the number of shares ψc held in
the collateral account are uniquely determined by equations (3) and (7), respectively.
Definition 3.2. A collateralized trading strategy ϕ is self-financing if, for t ∈ [0, T ], it holds that
Vt(ϕ) := V0(ϕ) +
∫ t
0
ξu dSu +
∫ t
0
ξIu dP
I
u +
∫ t
0
ξCu dP
C
u +
∫ t
0
ξfu dB
rf
u +
∫ t
0
ψu dB
rr
u −
∫ t
0
ψcu dB
rc
u ,
where V0(ϕ) is an arbitrary real number.
Moreover, we define the class of admissible strategies as follows:
Definition 3.3. The admissible control set is a class of F-predictable locally bounded trading strategies,
such that the portfolio process is bounded from below, see also Delbaen and Schachermayer (2006).
4 Arbitrage-free pricing and XVA
The goal of this section is to find prices for the derivative security with payoff Φ(ST ) that are free from
arbitrage in a certain sense. Before discussing arbitrage-free prices, we have to make sure that the
underlying market does not admit arbitrage from the hedger’s perspective (as discussed in (Bielecki
and Rutkowski, 2014, Section 3)). In the underlying market, the trader is only allowed to borrow/lend
stock, buy/sell risky bonds and borrow/lend from the funding desk. In particular, neither the deriva-
tive security, nor the collateral process is involved.
Definition 4.1. We say that the market (St, P It , PCt ) admits a hedger’s arbitrage if we can find controls
(ξf , ξ, ξI , ξC) such that for some initial capital x ≥ 0, denoting the wealth process with this initial capital
as Vt(x), t ≥ 0, we have that P
[
Vτ (x) ≥ er
+
f
τV0(x)
]
= 1 and P
[
Vτ (x) > er
+
f
τV0(x)
]
> 0. If the market
does not admit hedger’s arbitrage for all x ≥ 0, we say that the market is arbitrage free from the
hedger’s perspective.
In the sequel, we make the following standing assumption:
Assumption 4.2. The following relations hold between the different rates: r+r ≤ r−f , r+f ≤ r−f ,
r+f ∨ rD < rI + hPI and r+f ∨ rD < rC + hPC .
Remark 4.3. The above assumption is necessary to preclude arbitrage. The condition rD <
(
rI + hPI
)
∧(
rC + hPC
)
is needed for the existence of the valuation measure as discussed at the end of section 3.1
(hQi = ri + hPi − rD, i = I, C, and risk-neutral default intensities must be positive). If, by contradic-
tion, r+r > r−f , the trader can borrow cash from the funding desk at the rate r
−
f and lend it to the repo
market at the rate r+r , while holding the stock as a collateral. This results in a sure win for the trader.
Similarly, if the trader could fund his strategy from the treasury at a rate r−f < r
+
f , it would clearly
result in an arbitrage. The condition r+f < rI + hPI (and mutatis mutandis r
+
f < r
C + hPC) has a more
practical interpretation: as
dP It = rIP It dt− P It− d$I,Pt = (rI + hPI )P It dt− P It− dHI,Pt ,
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it precludes the arbitrage opportunity of short selling the bond underwritten by the trader’s firm with
value P It and investing the proceeds in the funding account.
We next provide a sufficient condition guaranteeing that the underlying market is free of arbitrage.
Proposition 4.4. Assume, in addition to Assumption 4.2, that r+r ≤ r+f ≤ r−r . Then the model does
not admit arbitrage opportunities for the hedger for any x ≥ 0.
We remark that in a market model without defaultable securities, similar inequalities between
borrowing and lending rates have been derived by Bielecki and Rutkowski (2014) (Proposition 3.3),
and by Nie and Rutkowski (2013) (Proposition 3.1). We impose additional relations between lending
rates and return rates of the risky bonds given that our model also allows for counterparty risk.
Proof. First, observe that under the conditions given above we have
rrψt = r+r ψt1l{ψt>0} + r−r ψt1l{ψt<0} ≤ r+f ψt1l{ψt>0} + r+f ψt1l{ψt<0} = r+f ψt
rfξ
f
t = r+f ξ
f
t 1l{ξft >0} + r
−
f ξ
f
t 1l{ξft <0} ≤ r
+
f ξ
f
t 1l{ξft >0} + r
+
f ξ
f
t 1l{ξft <0} = r
+
f ξ
f
t
Next, it is convenient to write the wealth process under a suitable measure P˜ specified via the stochastic
exponential
dP˜
dP
∣∣∣∣
Gτ
= e
r+
f
−µ
σ
W Pτ−
(r+
f
−µ)2
2σ2 τ
(
1 +
rI − r+f
hPI
)HIτ
e(r
+
f
−rI)τ(1 + rC − r+f
hPC
)HCτ
e(r
+
f
−rC)τ
By Girsanov’s theorem, P˜ is an equivalent measure to P such that the dynamics of the risky assets are
given by
dSt = r+f St dt+ σStdW
P˜
t ,
dP It = r+f P
I
t dt− P It−d$I,P˜t ,
dPCt = r+f P
C
t dt− PCt−d$C,P˜t
where W P˜ := (W P˜t ; 0 ≤ t ≤ τ) is a P˜ Brownian motion, while $I,P˜ := ($I,P˜t ; 0 ≤ t ≤ τ) and
$C,P˜ := ($C,P˜t ; 0 ≤ t ≤ τ) are P˜-martingales. The r+f discounted assets S˜t := e−r
+
f
tSt, P˜ It := e
−r+
f
tP It
and P˜Ct := e
−r+
f
tPCt are thus P˜-martingales. In particular, W P˜ = W P +
µ−r+
f
σ and for i ∈ {I, C},
trader and counterparty default intensity under P˜ are given by hP˜i = ri − r+f + hPi > 0 in light of the
assumptions of the proposition.
Denote the wealth process associated with (St, P It , PCt )t≥0 in the underlying market by V 0t . Using
the self-financing condition, its dynamics are given by
dV 0t =
(
rfξ
f
t B
rf
t + r+f ξtSt + rrψtB
rr
t + r+f ξ
I
t P
I
t + r+f ξ
C
t P
C
t
)
dt
+ ξtσSt dW P˜t − ξIt−P It− d$I,P˜t − ξCt−PCt− d$C,P˜t
=
(
rfξ
f
t B
rf
t + rrψtBrrt
)
dt+ ξt dSt + ξIt− dP It + ξCt− dPCt .
13
Assume that the initial capital at disposal of the trader is x ≥ 0. Then we have that
V 0τ (x)− V 00 (x) =
∫ τ
0
(
r+f ξtSt + rfξ
f
t B
rf
t + rrψtBrrt + r+f ξ
I
t P
I
t + r+f ξ
C
t P
C
t
)
dt
+
∫ τ
0
ξtσSt dW
P˜
t −
∫ τ
0
ξIt−P
I
t− d$
I,P˜
t −
∫ τ
0
ξCt−P
C
t− d$
C,P˜
t
≤
∫ τ
0
(
r+f ξtSt + r
+
f ξ
f
t B
rf
t + r+f ψtB
rr
t + r+f ξ
I
t P
I
t + r+f ξ
C
t P
C
t
)
dt
+
∫ τ
0
ξtσSt dW
P˜
t −
∫ τ
0
ξIt−P
I
t− d$
I,P˜
t −
∫ τ
0
ξCt−P
C
t− d$
C,P˜
t
=
∫ τ
0
r+f V
0
t (x) dt+
∫ τ
0
ξtσSt dW
P˜
t −
∫ τ
0
ξIt−P
I
t− d$
I,P˜
t −
∫ τ
0
ξCt−P
C
t− d$
C,P˜
t .
Therefore, it follows that
e−r
+
f
τV 0τ (x)− V 00 (x) ≤
∫ τ
0
ξt dS˜t −
∫ τ
0
ξIt− dP˜
I
t− −
∫ τ
0
ξCt− dP˜
C
t−.
Note now that the right hand side is a local martingale bounded from below (as the value process
is bounded from below by the admissibility condition), and therefore is a supermartingale. Taking
expectations, we conclude that
EP˜
[
e−r
+
f
τV 0τ (x)− V 00 (x)
] ≤ 0
and therefore either P˜
[
V 0τ (x) = e
r+
f
τx
]
= 1 or P˜
[
V 0τ (x) < e
r+
f
τx
]
> 0. As P˜ is equivalent to P, this
shows that arbitrage opportunities for the hedger are precluded in this model (as r+f is the riskless
rate he would receive by lending the positive cash amount x to the funding desk).
Next we want to define the notion of an arbitrage free price of a derivative security from the
hedger’s perspective.
Definition 4.5. A valuation P ∈ R of a derivative security with terminal payoff ϑ ∈ FT is called
hedger’s arbitrage-free if for all γ ∈ R, buying γ securities for the price γP and hedging in the market
with an admissible strategy and zero initial capital, does not create hedger’s arbitrage.
Before giving a characterization of hedger’s arbitrage prices, we first need to return to the wealth
dynamics. Since our goal is to define the total valuation adjustment under the valuation measure Q,
we first rewrite the dynamics of the wealth process under this measure. Using the condition (3), we
obtain from (11) that
dVt =
(
rfξ
f
t B
rf
t + (rD − rr)ξtSt + rDξIt P It + rDξCt PCt − rcψctBrct
)
dt
+ ξtσSt dWQt − ξIt−P It− d$I,Qt − ξCt−PCt− d$C,Qt
=
(
r+f
(
ξft B
rf
t
)+ − r−f (ξft Brft )− + (rD − r−r )(ξtSt)+ − (rD − r+r )(ξtSt)− + rDξIt P It + rDξCt PCt ) dt(
−r−c
(
ψctB
rc
t
)+ + r+c (ψctBrct )−) dt
+ ξtσSt dWQt − ξIt−P It− d$I,Qt − ξCt−PCt− d$C,Qt
=
(
r+f
(
ξft B
rf
t
)+ − r−f (ξft Brft )− + (rD − r−r )(ξtSt)+ − (rD − r+r )(ξtSt)− + rDξIt P It + rDξCt PCt ) dt
−
(
r+c
(
Ct
)+ − r−c (Ct)−) dt
+ ξtσSt dWQt − ξIt−P It− d$I,Qt − ξCt−PCt−d$C,Qt (12)
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Set now
Zt = ξtσSt
ZIt = −ξIt−P It−
ZCt = −ξCt−PCt−. (13)
Moreover, using again the condition (3) with (11), we obtain
ξft B
rf
t = Vt(ϕ)− ξIt P It − ξCt PCt + ψctBrct
= Vt(ϕ)− ξIt P It − ξCt PCt − Ct
Then the dynamics (12) reads as
dVt =
(
r+f
(
Vt + ZIt + ZCt − Ct
)+ − r−f (Vt + ZIt + ZCt − Ct)−
+ (rD − r−r )
1
σ
(
Zt
)+ − (rD − r+r ) 1σ (Zt)− − rDZIt − rDZCt −
(
r+c
(
Ct
)+ − r−c (Ct)−) )dt
+ Zt dWQt + ZIt d$
I,Q
t + ZCt d$
C,Q
t (14)
We next define
f+
(
t, v, z, zI , zC ; Vˆ
)
= −
(
r+f
(
v + zI + zC − αVˆt
)+ − r−f (v + zI + zC − αVˆt)−
+ (rD − r−r )
1
σ
z+ − (rD − r+r )
1
σ
z− − rDzI − rDzC
+ r+c
(
αVˆt
)+ − r−c (αVˆt)−) (15)
f−
(
t, v, z, zI , zC ; Vˆ
)
= −f+(t,−v,−z,−zI ,−zC ;−Vˆt) (16)
where the driver depends on the market valuation process (Vˆt) (via the collateral (Ct)). In particular
f± : Ω × [0, T ] × R4, (ω, t, v, z, zI , zC) 7→ f±(t, v, z, zI , zC ; Vˆt(ω)) are drivers of BSDEs as discussed
in Appendix A. Moreover, define V +(γ), V −(γ) as solutions of the BSDEs −dV
+
t (γ) = f+
(
t, V +t , Z
+
t , Z
I,+
t , Z
C,+
t ; Vˆ
)
dt− Z+t dWQt − ZI,+t d$I,Qt − ZC,+t d$C,Qt
V +τ (γ) = γ
(
θτ (Vˆ )1l{τ<T} + Φ(ST )1l{τ=T}
) (17)
and  −dV
−
t (γ) = f−
(
t, V −t , Z
−
t , Z
I,−
t , Z
C,−
t ; Vˆ
)
dt− Z−t dWQt − ZI,−t d$I,Qt − ZC,−t d$C,Qt
V −τ (γ) = γ
(
θτ (Vˆ )1l{τ<T} + Φ(ST )1l{τ=T}
) (18)
We note that
(
V +t (γ)
)
describes the wealth process when replicating the claim γΦ(ST ) for γ > 0
(hence hedging the position after selling γ securities with terminal payoff Φ(ST )). On the other hand,(−V −t (γ)) describes the wealth process when replicating the claim −γΦ(ST ), γ > 0 (hence hedging the
position after buying γ securities with terminal payoff Φ(ST )). To ease the notation we set V +t (1) = V +t
and V −t (1) = V −t . We note also that the two BSDEs are intrinsically related: (V −t , Z−t , Z
I,−
t , Z
C,−
t ) is
a solution to the data
(
f−, θτ (Vˆ ),Φ(ST )
)
exactly if (−V −t ,−Z−t ,−ZI,−t ,−ZC,−t ) is a solution to the
data
(
f+, θτ (−Vˆ ),−Φ(ST )
)
.
15
Theorem 4.6. Let Φ be a function of polynomial growth. Assume that
r+r ≤ r+f ≤ r−r , r+f ≤ r−f , r+f ∨ rD < rI + hPI , r+f ∨ rD < rC + hPC , (19)
and
r+c ∨ r−c ≤ r−f ≤
(
rI + hPI
) ∧ (rC + hPC). (20)
If V −0 ≤ V +0 , (where (V +t ) and (V −t ) are the (first components of) solutions of the BSDEs (17) and
(18)), then there exist prices pisup and piinf , piinf ≤ pisup, (called hedger’s upper and lower arbitrage
price) for the option Φ(ST ) such that all prices in the closed interval [piinf , pisup] are free of hedger’s
arbitrage. All prices strictly bigger than pisup and strictly smaller than piinf provide then arbitrage
opportunities for the hedger. In particular, we have that pisup = V +0 and piinf = V −0 .
Proof. First, notice that by virtue of the conditions in (19), the underlying market model is free of
hedger’s arbitrage. Notice that by positive homogeneity of the drivers f+ and f− of the BSDEs (17)
and (18), it is enough to consider the cases with γ = 1. We note that the polynomial growth of
Φ entails that ϑ = Φ(ST ) ∈ L2(Ω,FT ,Q). As (17) and (18) satisfy the conditions (A1) – (A3) of
Assumption A.1, the BSDEs have unique solutions.
Next, we note that we can perfectly hedge the option with terminal payoff Φ(ST ) using the initial
capital V +0 . Thus it is clear that any price P > V +0 is not arbitrage free, as we could just sell the
option for that price, use V +0 to hedge the claim and put P − V +0 in the funding account. Using the
same argument it is true that when buying an option, any price P < V −0 will lead to arbitrage.
Thus if V −0 ≤ V +0 we can conclude that all arbitrage free prices are within the interval [piinf =
V −0 , V
+
0 = pisup], whereas if V −0 > V +0 there are no arbitrage free prices.
Second, assume by contradiction that a valuation P ≤ V +0 would lead to an arbitrage when selling
the option. This means that starting with initial capital P , the trader can perfectly hedge a claim
with terminal payoff ϑ′ ∈ FT , where ϑ′ ≥ ϑ = Φ(ST ) a.s. and P[ϑ′ > ϑ] > 0. We have
f+(t, u¯, z¯, z¯I , z¯C ; Vˆ ϑ′t )− f+(t, u¯, z¯, z¯I , z¯C ; Vˆ ϑt )
=
(
r−f − r+f
) ((
u¯+ z¯I + z¯C + (1− α)Vˆ ϑ′t
)+ − (u¯+ z¯I + z¯C + (1− α)Vˆ ϑt )+)+ αr−f (Vˆ ϑ′t − Vˆ ϑt )
+ αr−c
(
(Vˆ ϑ′t )− − (Vˆ ϑt )−
)
− αr+c
((
Vˆ ϑ
′
t
)+ − (Vˆ ϑt )+)
≥ α(r−f − (r+c ∨ r−c ))(Vˆ ϑ′t − Vˆ ϑt ) ≥ 0,
where for the first inequality we have used that fact that α < 1, and that r−f ≥ r+f , and (20) for the
second inequality.
Notice that ϑ′ ≥ ϑ implies that Vˆ ϑ′t ≥ Vˆ ϑt , which in turn leads to the following inequality between
the closeout terms: θτ (Vˆ ϑ
′
t )1l{τ<T} ≥ θτ (Vˆ ϑt )1l{τ<T} (see also (10) for the definition of the closeout).
Thus, we can apply the comparison principle Theorem A.3. It thus follows that V ϑ′t ≥ V ϑt and in
particular P > V +0 (using strict comparison, i.e., P = V0 implies ϑ′ = ϑ a.s.), contradicting our
assumption. Using a symmetric argument, it follows that P ≥ V −0 . Thus, if V −0 ≤ V +0 , we can
conclude that all valuations in the interval [piinf = V −0 , V +0 = pisup] are arbitrage-free, whereas no
arbitrage free valuation exists if V −0 > V +0 .
Our goal is to compute the total valuation adjustment XVA that has to be added to the Black-
Scholes price to get the actual price. As we have seen, the situation is asymmetric for sell- and
buy-prices, so we will have to define different sell- and buy XVAs.
16
Definition 4.7. The seller’s XVA is the G-adapted stochastic process (XVAsellt ) defined as
XVAsellt := V +t − Vˆ (t, St)
while the buyer’s XVA is defined as
XVAbuyt := V −t − Vˆ (t, St).
XV Asell corresponds to the total costs (including collateral servicing costs, funding costs, and
counterparty adjustment costs) that the hedger incurs when replicating the payoff of an option he
sold, whereas XVAbuy corresponds to the total costs (including collateral servicing costs, funding
costs, and counterparty adjustment costs) that the hedger incurs when replicating the payoff of an
option he purchased. As we will see in Section 5.1, these two XVAs agree only in the case where the
drivers of the BSDEs are linear. We note that the difference of the XVAs also describes the width of
the no-arbitrage interval, as
XVAsell0 −XVAbuy0 = V +0 − V −0 = pisup − piinf .
5 Explicit examples
We specialize our framework to deal with a concrete example for which we can provide fully explicit
expressions of the total valuation adjustment. More specifically, we consider an extension of Piterbarg
(2010)’s model accounting for counterparty credit risk and closeout costs. This means that defaultable
bonds of trader and counterparty become an integral part of the hedging strategy. Throughout the
section, we make the following assumptions on the interest rates as in Piterbarg’s setup:
r+f = r
−
f = rf
r+c = r−c = rc
rD = r+r = r−r = rr (21)
The difference between the discount rate rD chosen by the third party and the repo rate may also be
interpreted as a proxy for illiquidity of the repo market. Under this interpretation, rD = rr would
indicate a regime of full liquidity. Piterbarg (2010) mentions that the case to be expected in practice
is rf > rr > rc (and rf ≥ rr is indeed necessary for no-arbitrage reasons, see Remark 4.3).
5.1 Piterbarg’s model
As in Piterbarg (2010) we do not take into account default risk of the trader and counterparty,
hence implying that the transaction is always terminated at τ = T . Under this setting, using the
collateral specification from Section 3.2, we obtain an explicit, closed-form expression of the total
value adjustment as well as of the optimal (super)-hedging strategy.
We first note that equations (17) and (18) coincide by linearity and a transformation V˜t =(
B
rf
t
)−1
V +t =
(
B
rf
t
)−1
V −t simplifies the situation. Writing the BSDE in integral form we have
V˜t =
(
B
rf
T
)−1Φ(ST )− ∫ T
t
Z˜sdW
Q
s +
∫ T
t
(
B
rf
s
)−1(
rf − rc
)
αVˆ (s, Ss)ds−
∫ T
t
(
rD − rr
) 1
σ
Z˜sds
=
(
B
rf
T
)−1Φ(ST )− ∫ T
t
Z˜sdW
Q
s +
∫ T
t
(
B
rf
s
)−1(
rf − rc
)
αVˆ (s, Ss)ds, (22)
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where we have used the collateral specification given in (9), and the assumption that rD = rr. This
immediately implies that in case when all rates rf , rr, rc are the same, then the total valuation
adjustment becomes zero. Otherwise, it is nonzero and given by two main contributions:
1. The first term captures the adjustment due to discounting the terminal value of the claim at the
funding rate rf . Since rf is usually higher than the risk-free rate in the Black-Scholes model,
we would obtain that EQ
[(
B
rf
T
)−1Φ(ST )] is smaller than the corresponding quantity evaluated
using the risk-free rate.
2. The last term captures the adjustment, proportional to the size of posted collateral αVˆ (t, St),
originating from the difference between funding and collateral rates.
Using the Clark-Ocone formula, we can find Z˜t by means of Malliavin Calculus. We have that
Z˜t = EQ
[
Dt
((
B
rf
T
)−1Φ(ST ) + ∫ T
t
e−rf s
(
rf − rc
)
αVˆ (s, Ss) ds
)∣∣∣Ft],
where Dt denotes the Malliavin derivative which may be computed as
Dt
((
B
rf
T
)−1Φ(ST ) + ∫ T
t
(
B
rf
s
)−1(
rf − rc
)
αVˆ (s, Ss)ds
)
=
(
B
rf
T
)−1Φ′(ST )DtST + α ∫ T
t
(
B
rf
s
)−1(
rf − rc
)
DtVˆ (s, Ss) ds
=
(
B
rf
T
)−1Φ′(ST )σST + α ∫ T
t
(
B
rf
s
)−1(
rf − rc
) ∂
∂x
Vˆ (s, Ss)σST ds. (23)
Above, we have used the chain rule of Malliavin calculus and the well known fact that DtST = σST .3
We expect that the Z˜ term of the BSDE would correspond to an “adjusted delta hedging” strategy,
with the delta hedging strategy recovered if all rates are identical. Indeed, let us denote the market
Delta by
∆ˆ(t, St) :=
∂
∂x
Vˆ (t, St) =
∂
∂x
EQ
[Brrt
BrrT
Φ(ST )|Ft
]
and note that by a martingale argument
∆ˆ(t, St)
St
Brrt
= EQ
[
Φ′(ST )
ST
BrrT
∣∣∣Ft] = EQ[ ST
BrrT
∆ˆ(T, ST )
∣∣∣Ft].
Then the Malliavin derivative from (23) can be written in terms of Delta as
Dt
(
...
)
= 1
B
rf
T
Φ′(ST )σST + α
∫ T
t
1
B
rf
s
(rf − rc)∆ˆ(s, Ss)σSs ds.
3We refer to Nualart (1995) for an introduction to Malliavin derivatives.
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Therefore we get
Z˜t = σEQ
[ 1
B
rf
T
Φ′(ST )ST
∣∣∣Ft]+ α ∫ T
t
1
B
rf
s
(rf − rc)σEQ
[
∆ˆ(s, Ss)Ss
∣∣Ft] ds
= σB
rr
T
B
rf
T
EQ
[
Φ′(ST )
ST
BrrT
∣∣∣Ft]+ α ∫ T
t
1
B
rf
s
(rf − rc)σBrrs EQ
[
∆ˆ(s, Ss)
Ss
Brrs
∣∣∣Ft] ds
= σB
rr
T
B
rf
T
St
Brrt
∆ˆ(t, St) + α
∫ T
t
1
B
rf
s
(rf − rc)σBrrs EQ
[
∆ˆ(s, Ss)
Ss
Brrs
∣∣∣Ft] ds
= 1
B
rf
T
BrrT
Brrt
σSt∆ˆ(t, St) + α
∫ T
t
1
B
rf
s
(rf − rc)σBrrs ∆ˆ(t, St)
St
Brrt
ds
= 1
B
rf
T
BrrT
Brrt
σSt∆ˆ(t, St) + α
(
1− rc
rf
)( 1
B
rf
t
− 1
B
rf
T
)
BrrT
Brrt
σSt∆ˆ(t, St) (24)
= 1
B
rf
T
BrrT
Brrt
σSt∆ˆ(t, St) + α
1
Brrt
(rf − rc
rr − rf
)(BrrT
B
rf
T
− B
rr
t
B
rf
t
)
σSt∆ˆ(t, St) (25)
We clearly see that Z˜t is square integrable and therefore the stochastic integral in (22) is a true
martingale. Thus we can calculate V˜t directly by taking conditional expectations:
V˜t = EQ
[(
B
rf
T
)−1Φ(ST )∣∣Ft]+ α(rf − rc) ∫ T
t
(
B
rf
s
)−1
Brrs EQ
[(
Brrs
)−1
Vˆ (s, Ss)
∣∣Ft]ds
=
(
B
rf
T
)−1
BrrT
1
Brrt
Vˆ (t, St) + α(rf − rc)
∫ T
t
(
B
rf
s
)−1
Brrs
(
Brrt
)−1
Vˆ (t, St)ds (26)
In the second step, we have used the fact that (Brrt )−1Vˆ (t, St) is a Ft martingale. Hence, we obtain
V˜t =
BrrT
B
rf
T
1
Brrt
Vˆ (t, St) + α(rf − rc) 1
Brrt
Vˆ (t, St)
∫ T
t
Brrs
B
rf
s
ds
= B
rr
T
B
rf
T
1
Brrt
Vˆ (t, St) + α
1
Brrt
rf − rc
rf − rr
(Brrt
B
rf
t
− B
rr
T
B
rf
T
)
Vˆ (t, St) (27)
= 1
Brrt
(
BrrT
B
rf
T
+ αrf − rc
rf − rr
(Brrt
B
rf
t
− B
rr
T
B
rf
T
))
Vˆ (t, St)
:= βtVˆ (t, St) (28)
The above equation (28) gives the price in terms of a unique adjustment factor, while (27) tracks
separately the adjustment that comes from using a particular funding rate and that one coming from
the collateralization procedure. We can therefore directly write down the total valuation adjustment
as
XVAt = Vt − Vˆt = Brft V˜t − Vˆt =
(
B
rf
t
Brrt
(
BrrT
B
rf
T
+ αrf − rc
rf − rr
(Brrt
B
rf
t
− B
rr
T
B
rf
T
))
− 1
)
Vˆ (t, St) (29)
From the representation (29), we can see that it is obtained as a percentage of the publicly available
price Vˆ (t, St) of the claim. Note that from (13), Z˜t =
(
B
rf
t
)−1
ξtσSt. Using this along with (25) we
obtain that the number of stock shares ξt held by the hedger in his replication strategy is given by
ξt =
B
rf
t
B
rf
T
BrrT
Brrt
∆ˆ(t, St) +
B
rf
t
Brrt
(
α
rf − rc
rf − rr
(Brrt
B
rf
t
− B
rr
T
B
rf
T
))
∆ˆ(t, St) (30)
= βtB
rf
t ∆ˆ(t, St). (31)
19
0.08 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15
rf
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
R
el
at
iv
e 
XV
A 
(%
)
α = 0
α = 0.25
α = 0.75
α = 1
0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2
0.44
0.46
0.48
0.5
0.52
0.54
0.56
rf
St
oc
k 
sh
ar
es
 
 
α = 0
α = 0.25
α = 0.75
α = 1
Figure 4: Left panel: XVA as a function of rf for different collateralization levels α. Right panel:
Number of stock shares in the replication strategy. We set rD = 0.05, rc = 0.01, σ = 0.2, and α = 0.
The claim is an at-the-money European call option with maturity T = 1.
The representation (30) gives a decomposition of the strategy in a first part consisting of a Delta
hedging strategy adjusted for funding costs, and a second part giving a correction due to the gap
between funding and collateral rates. The representation (31) gives instead an overall adjustment
factor. Let us finally note that the extension to only almost everywhere differentiable payoffs (as
European put and call options) follows directly from the a.s. convergence of the Black-Scholes prices
and Deltas.
We next analyze the dependence of XVA on funding rates and collateralization levels. Figure 4
shows that the XVA is negative when the collateralization level is small. This is consistent with the
expression (29), and can be understood as follows. In the classical Black-Scholes case, the hedger
borrows and lends money at rate rD = rr. In our case, however, he borrows the cash needed to buy
the stock at the repo rate rr (cash-driven transaction). He invests the remaining amount coming from
the received option premium at the funding rate rf > rr. By contrast, in a Black-Scholes world the
hedger would have invested this amount at the lower rate rr. This explains why the XVA is negative.
As α gets larger, the trader also needs to finance purchases of the collateral which he needs to post to
the counterparty. In order to do so, he borrows from the treasury at the rate rf . However, he would
only receive interests at rate rc on the posted collateral. This yields a loss to the trader given that
rc < rr < rf . Figure 4 confirms our intuition. It also shows that the stock position of the trader
decreases as the funding rate rf increases, and increases if the collateralization level α increases.
5.2 Piterbarg’s model with defaults
In this section, we extend Piterbarg’s model by including the possibility of a default by investor or
counterparty. Thus we are working under the general framework put forward in this paper. Again,
we assume the rates equalities in (21) to be consistent with Piterbarg’s setup.
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5.2.1 The general representation formula
As for the case of Piterbarg model without defaults treated in the previous section, the BSDEs (17)
and (18) agree by linearity, and switching to rf -discounted quantities they reduce to
−dV˜t =
((
rD − rf
)
Z˜It +
(
rD − rf
)
Z˜Ct
)
+
(
rf − rc
)
C˜t
)
dt
− Z˜t dWQt − Z˜It d$I,Qt − Z˜Ct d$C,Qt
V˜τ =
(
B
rf
T
)−1Φ(ST )1l{τ=T} + (Brfτ )−1θτ (Vˆ )1l{τ<T}
(32)
Proposition 5.1. The BSDE (32) admits an a.s. unique solution given by the explicit representation
V˜t1l{τ≥t} = EQ
[((
B
rf
T
)−1Φ(ST )1l{τ=T} + (Brfτ )−1θτ (Vˆ )1l{t<τ<T})Γτt
−
∫ τ
t∧τ
(
rc − rf
)
C˜sΓst ds
∣∣∣∣Gt]
where
Γst :=
(
1 + rD − rf
hQI
)HIs∧τ−HIt∧τ
e(rf−rD)(s∧τ−t∧τ)
(
1 + rD − rf
hQC
)HCs∧τ−HCt∧τ
e(rf−rD)(s∧τ−t∧τ)
Proof. Existence and uniqueness follows from Theorem A.2. We follow the classical approach for linear
BSDEs, e.g. as given for the Lévy-process case by (Quenez and Sulem, 2013, Section 3) to construct
the concrete solution. We note first that (Γst ){s≥t} is a Doléans-Dade exponential and satisfies
Γst = 1 +
∫ s∧τ
t∧τ
Γu−t
rD − rf
hQI
d$I,Qu +
∫ s∧τ
t∧τ
Γu−t
rD − rf
hQC
d$C,Qu .
Therefore, we have
V˜τΓτt − V˜t∧τΓt∧τt =
∫ τ
t∧τ
V˜s− dΓst +
∫ τ
t∧τ
Γs−t dV˜s +
[
V˜·,Γ·t
]
τ
− [V˜·,Γ·t]t∧τ
=
∫ τ
t∧τ
V˜s−Γs−t
rD − rf
hQI
d$I,Qs +
∫ τ
t∧τ
V˜s−Γs−t
rD − rf
hQC
d$C,Qs +
∫ τ
t∧τ
Γs−t Z˜s dWQs
+
∫ τ
t∧τ
Γs−t Z˜Is d$I,Qs +
∫ τ
t∧τ
Γs−t Z˜Cs d$C,Qs
−
∫ τ
t∧τ
Γs−t
((
rD − rf
)
Z˜Is +
(
rD − rf
)
Z˜Cs +
(
rf − rc
)
C˜s
)
ds
+
∫ τ
t∧τ
Γs−t
rD − rf
hQI
Z˜Is d$
I,Q
s +
∫ τ
t∧τ
Γs−t
rD − rf
hQC
Z˜Cs d$
C,Q
s
+
∫ τ
t∧τ
Γs−t
(
rD − rf
)
Z˜Is ds+
∫ τ
t∧τ
Γs−t
(
rD − rf
)
Z˜Cs ds
= −
∫ τ
t∧τ
Γs−t
(
rf − rc
)
C˜s ds+Mτ −Mt∧τ
where (Ms) given by
Ms =
∫ s∧τ
t∧τ
Γu−t
((
V˜u− + Z˜Iu
)rD − rf
hQI
+ Z˜Iu
)
d$I,Qu
+
∫ s∧τ
t∧τ
Γu−t
((
V˜u− + Z˜Cu
)rD − rf
hQC
+ Z˜Cu
)
d$C,Qu +
∫ s∧τ
t∧τ
Γu−t Z˜u dWQu
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is a true martingale (as all coefficients are bounded). Multiplying with 1l{τ≥t} and taking conditional
expectations with respect to Gt yields
V˜t1l{τ≥t} = V˜tΓtt1l{τ≥t} = EQ
[
V˜τΓτt 1l{τ≥t} +
∫ τ
t∧τ
Γs−t
(
rf − rc
)
C˜s ds
∣∣∣∣Gt]
and thus the solution.
Using Eq. (10) along with the collateral specification given in Eq. (9), we note in particular that
we can also write the representation as
V˜t1l{τ≥t} = EQ
[(
B
rf
T
)−1Φ(ST )ΓTt 1l{τ=T} ∣∣∣Gt]
+ EQ
[(
B
rf
τI
)−1(1− (1− α)LI)Vˆ (τI , SτI )ΓτIt 1l{t<τI<τC∧T ;Vˆ (τI ,SτI )≥0}
+
(
B
rf
τI
)−1
Vˆ (τI , SτI )Γ
τI
t 1l{t<τI<τC∧T ;Vˆ (τI ,SτI )<0}
∣∣∣Gt]
+ EQ
[(
B
rf
τC
)−1(1− (1− α)LC)Vˆ (τC , SτC )ΓτCt 1l{t<τC<τI∧T ;Vˆ (τC ,SτC )<0}
+
(
B
rf
τC
)−1
Vˆ (τC , SτC )Γ
τC
t 1l{t<τC<τI∧T ;Vˆ (τC ,SτC )≥0}
∣∣∣Gt]
+ EQ
[
α
(
rf − rc
) ∫ τ
t∧τ
(
B
rf
s
)−1
Vˆ (s, Ss)Γst ds
∣∣∣Gt]. (33)
This decomposition allows for the nice interpretation of the XVA in terms of four separate contribut-
ing terms. The first term corresponds to the default- and collateralization free price under funding
constraints, the second one to the (funding-adjusted) payout after default of the trader, the third one
to the (funding-adjusted) payout after counterparty’s default and finally the last one to the funding
costs of the collateralization procedure.
5.2.2 Explicit computation of XVA
To facilitate the calculation of V˜t, we prove first a useful lemma.
Lemma 5.2. For t, s ∈ [0, T ], t ≤ s, we have
EQ
[
1l{τ≥s}
∣∣Gt] = e−(hQI+hQC)(s−t)1l{τ≥t} (34)
Moreover, if (Mt)0≤t≤T is an F-measurable, square integrable (Q,G)-martingale and λ ∈ R, then if
λ 6= hQI , λ 6= hQC and λ 6= hQI + hQC , we have
EQ
[
eλτIMτI1l{t<τI<τC∧T}
∣∣Gt] (35)
= h
Q
I
λ− hQI
eλt
(
hQC
λ− hQI − hQC
(
e(λ−h
Q
I−hQC)(T−t) − 1
)
− 1 + e−hQC(T−t)e(λ−hQI )(T−t)
)
Mt1l{τ>t},
as well as the analogous statement to (35) with I and C interchanged.
Proof. All the calculations follow from the fact that the indicators are independent of the filtration
F, the memorylessness of the exponential distribution as well as its explicit distributional properties
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and the independence of the two default times. We get by the “key lemma” (Bielecki and Rutkowski,
2001, Lemma 5.1.2)
EQ
[
1l{τ≥s}
∣∣Gt] = EQ[1l{τ≥s}
∣∣Ft]
Q[τ > t] 1l{τ≥t} =
Q[τ > s]
Q[τ > t] 1l{τ≥t} = e
−(hQI+hQC)(s−t)1l{τ≥t}.
Moreover, we note that we have again by the “key lemma” and memorylessness of the exponential
distribution
EQ
[
eλτIMτI1l{t<τI<τC∧T}
∣∣Gt] = EQ[eλτIMτI1l{t<τI<τC∧T}
∣∣Ft]
Q[τ > t] 1l{τ>t}
=
EQ
[∫∞
t
∫ z∧T
t e
λyMyh
Q
I e
−hQI yhQCe
−hQCz dydz
∣∣Ft]
Q[τ > t] 1l{τ>t}
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ z∧(T−t)
0
eλ(y+t)hQI e
−hQI yhQCe
−hQCz dydzMt1l{τ>t}
= h
Q
I
λ− hQI
eλt
(
hQC
λ− hQI − hQC
(
e(λ−h
Q
I−hQC)(T−t) − 1
)
− 1 + e−hQC(T−t)e(λ−hQI )(T−t)
)
Mt1l{τ>t}.
The reverse statement follows in the same way.
We now proceed to the calculation of V˜t, term by term. First we get by the tower property,
independence of the filtration F and H and (34) that
EQ
[(
B
rf
T
)−1Φ(ST )1l{τ=T}Γτt ∣∣∣Gt]
= B
rD
T
B
rf
T
e(rf−rD)(T−t)e(rf−rD)(T−t)EQ
[
EQ
[(
BrDT
)−1Φ(ST )1l{τ=T} ∣∣∣Ft ∨HT ] ∣∣∣∣Gt]
= B
rD
T
B
rf
T
e(rf−rD)(T−t)e(rf−rD)(T−t)EQ
[
1l{τ=T}
∣∣Gt](BrDt )−1Vˆ (t, St)
= B
rD
T
B
rf
T
1
BrDt
e(rf−rD−h
Q
I )(T−t)e(rf−rD−h
Q
C)(T−t)Vˆ (t, St)1l{τ≥t}
To simplify the calculation of the CVA and DVA terms, we make the following definitions:
Θˆs,+t := EQ
[
e−rD(s−t)Vˆ (s, Ss)1l{Vˆ (s,Ss)≥0}
∣∣∣Ft],
Θˆs,−t := EQ
[
e−rD(s−t)Vˆ (s, Ss)1l{Vˆ (s,Ss)<0}
∣∣∣Ft].
We note that Θˆs,+t (respectively Θˆ
s,−
t ) are public time-t-values of compound options, and
(
BrDt
)−1Θˆs,+t ,(
BrDt
)−1Θˆs,−t are the discounted values (and F-measurable G-martingales). More precisely, Θˆs,+t is the
value of a call option on the option Φ(ST ) with maturity s and strike zero, and Θˆs,−t is the respective
put option. We have
Vˆ (τI , SτI )1l{Vˆ (τI ,SτI )>0} = E
Q
[
Vˆ (τI , SτI )1l{Vˆ (τI ,SτI )>0}
∣∣∣FτI ] = ΘτI ,+τI
23
Note that using Lemma 5.2, we get for the first part of the DVA type term
EQ
[(
B
rf
τI
)−1(1− (1− α)LI)Vˆ (τI , SτI )ΓτIt 1l{t≤τI<τC∧T ;Vˆ (τI ,SτI )≥0} ∣∣∣Gt]
=
(
1− (1− α)LI
)
e−(2(rf−rD)t
(
1 + rD − rf
hQI
)
· EQ
[
eλτI
(
BrDτI
)−1ΘˆτI ,+τI 1l{t≤τI<τC∧T} ∣∣∣Gt]
=
(
1− (1− α)LI
)
e−2(rf−rD)t
(
1 + rD − rf
hQI
) hQI
λ− hQI
eλt
·
(
hQC
λ− hQC − hQI
(
e(λ−h
Q
C−hQI )(T−t) − 1
)
− 1 + e−hQC(T−t)e(λ−hQI )(T−t)
) 1
BrDt
ΘˆτI ,+t 1l{τ≥t}
=
(
1− (1− α)LI
)
e(rD−rf )t
(
1 + rD − rf
hQI
) hQI
λ− hQI
·
(
hQC
λ− hQC − hQI
(
e(λ−h
Q
C−hQI )(T−t) − 1
)
− 1 + e−hQC(T−t)e(λ−hQI )(T−t)
) 1
BrDt
ΘˆτI ,+t 1l{τ≥t}
with λ := rf − rD. Notice that by Assumption 4.2 we have
λ = rf − rD < ri + hPi − rD = hQi
for i ∈ {I, C}, and thus the conditions of Lemma 5.2 are satisfied. In the second equality above, we
have used that ΘτI ,+τI = Vˆ (τI , SτI )1l{Vˆ (τI ,SτI )>0} along with the fact that the process
(
BrDs
)−1ΘτI ,+s
is a Gt martingale, implying that EQ
[(
BrDτI
)−1ΘτI ,+τI
∣∣∣∣Gt] = (BrDt )−1ΘτI ,+t . Similarly, we have for the
second part
EQ
[(
B
rf
τI
)−1
Vˆ (τI , SτI )Γ
τI
t 1l{t≤τI<τC∧T ;Vˆ (τI ,SτI )<0}
∣∣∣Gt] =
= e(rD−rf )t
(
1 + rD − rf
hQC
) hQI
λ− hQI
·
(
hQC
λ− hQC − hQI
(
e(λ−h
Q
C−hQI )(T−t) − 1
)
− 1 + e−hQC(T−t)e(λ−hQI )(T−t)
) 1
BrDt
ΘˆτI ,−t 1l{τ≥t}.
For the CVA type term, we obtain
EQ
[(
B
rf
τC
)−1(1− (1− α)LC)Vˆ (τC , SτC )ΓτCt 1l{t≤τC<τI∧T ;Vˆ (τC ,SτC )<0} ∣∣∣Gt]
=
(
1− (1− α)LC
)
e(rD−rf )t
(
1 + rD − rf
hQC
) hQC
λ− hQC
·
(
hQI
λ− hQC − hQI
(
e(λ−h
Q
C−hQI )(T−t) − 1
)
− 1 + e−hQI (T−t)e(λ−hQC)(T−t)
) 1
BrDt
ΘˆτC ,−t 1l{τ≥t}
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and
EQ
[(
B
rf
τC
)−1
Vˆ (τC , SτC )Γ
τC
t 1l{t≤τC<τI∧T ;Vˆ (τI ,SτI )≥0}
∣∣∣Gt]
= e(rD−rf )t
(
1 + rD − rf
hQC
) hQC
λ− hQC
·
(
hQI
λ− hQC − hQI
(
e(λ−h
Q
C−hQI )(T−t) − 1
)
− 1 + e−hQI (T−t)e(λ−hQC)(T−t)
) 1
BrDt
ΘˆτC ,+t 1l{τ≥t}
Finally, the funding costs of the collateralization procedure are given by
EQ
[∫ τ
t∧τ
(
rc − rf
)
C˜sΓst ds
∣∣∣Gt]
= α
(
rf − rc
) ∫ T
t
EQ
[(
B
rf
s
)−1
Vˆ (s, Ss)Γst1l{τ≥s}
∣∣∣Gt] ds
= α
(
rf − rc
) ∫ T
t
BrDs
B
rf
s
e(rf−rD)(s−t)e(rf−rD)(s−t)
(
BrDt
)−1
Vˆ (t, St)EQ
[
1l{τ≥s}
∣∣Gt] ds
= α
(
rf − rc
)(
BrDt
)−1
Vˆ (t, St)
∫ T
t
BrDs
B
rf
s
e(rf−rD−h
Q
I )(s−t)e(rf−rD−h
Q
C)(s−t) ds1l{τ≥t}
= α rf − rc
hQI + h
Q
C − λ
1
BrDt
(
BrDt
B
rf
t
− B
rD
T
B
rf
T
e(rf−rD−h
Q
I )(T−t)e(rf−rD−h
Q
C)(T−t)
)
Vˆ (t, St)1l{τ≥t}.
The situation simplifies considerably if the payoff Φ is non-negative, as for short call or put positions,
or non-positive as for long ones. In the case of a non-negative payoff we have
ΘˆτC ,+t = Θˆ
τI ,+
t = Vˆ (t, St), Θˆ
τC ,−
t = Θˆ
τI ,−
t = 0.
Recalling that Vt = B
rf
t V˜t, we obtain
XVAt =
(
B
rf
t
BrDt
(
BrDT
B
rf
T
e(rf−rD−h
Q
I )(T−t)e(rf−rD−h
Q
C)(T−t)
+
(
1− (1− α)LI
)
e(rD−rf )t
(
1 + rD − rf
hQI
) hQI
λ− hQI
·
( hQC
λ− hQC − hQI
(
e(λ−h
Q
C−hQI )(T−t) − 1)− 1 + e−hQC(T−t)e(λ−hQI )(T−t))
+ e(rD−rf )t
(
1 + rD − rf
hQC
) hQC
λ− hQC
·
( hQI
λ− hQC − hQI
(
e(λ−h
Q
C−hQI )(T−t) − 1)− 1 + e−hQI (T−t)e(λ−hQC)(T−t))
+ α rf − rc
hQC + h
Q
I − λ
(BrDt
B
rf
t
− B
rD
T
B
rf
T
e(rf−rD−h
Q
C)(T−t)e(rf−rD−h
Q
I )(T−t)
))
− 1
)
Vˆ (t, St)1l{τ≥t}
:= (A− 1)Vˆ (t, St)1l{τ≥t},
25
where A is short-hand notation for the adjustment factor, i.e. A = Vt/Vˆ (t, St). Moreover, applying
Theorem A.5 we obtain that on the set {t < τ}, the optimal stock and bond investment strategies are
given by
ξt = A× VˆS(t, St),
ξit =
A× Vˆ (t, St)− θi(vˆ(t, St))
e−(rD+h
Q
i )(T−t)
, i ∈ {I, C}.
where we have used that on {t < τ} the bond price is P it = e−(rD+h
Q
i )(T−t) and used, with slight abuse
of notation, θi, i ∈ {I, C},as the contract at default of either party, similar to the way it was defined
in (10). Specifically,
θC(vˆ) := vˆ + LC((1− α)vˆ)−,
θI(vˆ) := vˆ − LI((1− α)vˆ)+.
This can be verified by a direct application of the “key lemma” (Bielecki and Rutkowski, 2001, Lemma
5.1.2) to the bond price in (4).
Figure 5 plots the different terms in the decomposition given by (33). Under the parameter
configuration corresponding to a safer scenario (left panel), the predominant contribution is given by
the default and collateralization-free price under funding constraints. The contributions coming from
the closeout positions realized at default time of the trader and of his counterparty are small. If the
default risk of trader and counterparty are very high (right panel), the contribution to the XVA coming
from the closeout payoff becomes larger. A direct comparison of the bottom panels of figures 6 and 7
shows that a similar number of trader’s bond shares are used to replicate the jumps to the closeout
values. However, as the return on the trader’s bond under the valuation measure is higher under the
risky scenario, it gives a larger contribution to the XVA.
When α is high, the XVA is positive, i.e. V0−Vˆ (0, S0) > 0. The jump to the closeout position when
the trader defaults first is given by VτI − Vˆ (τI , SτI )(1− (1−α)LI). It is higher than the corresponding
jump when the counterparty is the first to default, given by VτC−Vˆ (τC , SτC ). Consequently, we expect
a higher number of trader bond shares to be used in the replication strategy relatively to the number
of counterparty bond shares. This is reflected in figures 6 and 7. If α is small, the XVA is negative and
the size of the jump to the closeout value at default of the counterparty, VτC−Vˆ (τC , SτC ), would also be
negative. Hence, to replicate this position the trader would need to short counterparty bonds. However,
if the trader were to default first, the size of the jump would be given by VτI − Vˆ (τI , SτI )(1−(1−α)LI)
and be positive. Consequently, the trader would go long on his own bonds to replicate the jump. As
α increases, the size of the jump to the closeout payoff decreases, leading the trader to reduce the
position in his own bonds.
A direct comparison of figures 6 and 7 suggests that under the risky scenario and for not too high
collateralization levels, the trader increases the size of the long position in his own bonds and partly
finances it using the proceeds coming from a short position in counterparty bonds. Indeed, when
α = 0 and rf = 0.08 the trader shorts a higher number of counterparty bonds under the risky scenario
relatively to the safe scenario. At the same time, he increases the number of shares of his own bonds
under the risky scenario.
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Figure 5: Price decompositions (in % of the market value) in the Piterbarg model with defaults. We
set rD = 0.05, rc = 0.01, σ = 0.2, α = 0.25, LC = 0.5, LI = 0.5. The claim is an at-the-money
European call option with maturity T = 1. Left graph: hQI = 0.15, h
Q
C = 0.2. Right graph: h
Q
I = 0.5,
hQC = 0.5.
5.3 Counterparty adjustments as special cases of XVA
We show that bilateral credit valuation adjustments are recovered from our total valuation adjustment
formula in the absence of funding costs. This means that all rates are the same, namely rD = rf = rc,
hence public and private valuations coincide. Under this setting, it holds that Γst = 1 for any 0 ≤ t <
s ≤ T . Hence, Eq. (33) reduces to
V˜t1l{τ≥t} = EQ
[(
B
rf
T
)−1Φ(ST )1l{τ=T} + (Brfτ )−1θτ (Vˆ )1l{t<τ<T} ∣∣∣Gt]
= EQ
[(
B
rf
T
)−1Φ(ST )− (BrfT )−1Φ(ST )1l{t<τ<T} + (Brfτ )−1θτ (Vˆ )1l{t<τ<T} ∣∣∣Gt]
= 1l{τ≥t}(B
rf
t )−1Vˆ (t, St)− EQ
[(
B
rf
T
)−1Φ(ST )1l{t<τ<T}∣∣∣Gt]
+ EQ
[(
B
rf
τ
)−1
Vˆ (τ, Sτ )1l{t<τ<T}
∣∣∣Gt]
+ EQ
[
1l{t<τ<T}
(
B
rf
τ
)−11l{τC<τI}LC(−(Vˆ (τ, Sτ )− Cτ−))+∣∣∣Gt]
− EQ
[
1l{t<τ<T}
(
B
rf
τ
)−11l{τI<τC}LI((Vˆ (τ, Sτ )− Cτ−))+∣∣∣Gt]. (36)
Above, the last equality is obtained using the definition of Vˆ given in Eq. (9) and the expression for
the closeout amount given in Eq.(10). Next, let us analyze the third term in the above decomposition.
Using again the definition of Vˆ , we obtain from the law of iterated expectations that
EQ
[(
B
rf
τ
)−1
Vˆ (τ, Sτ )1l{t<τ<T}
∣∣∣Gt] = EQ[(Brfτ )−1EQ[(BrfT )−1Brfτ Φ(ST )∣∣∣Gτ ]1l{t<τ<T}∣∣∣Gt]
= EQ
[(
B
rf
T
)−1Φ(ST )1l{t<τ<T}∣∣∣Gt]
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Figure 6: Top left: XVA as a function of rf for different α. Top right: Number of stock shares in the
replication strategy. Bottom left: Number of trader bond shares in the replication strategy. Bottom
right: Number of counterparty bond shares in the replication strategy. We set rD = 0.05, rc = 0.01,
σ = 0.2, LC = 0.5, LI = 0.5, hQI = 0.15 and h
Q
C = 0.2. The claim is an at-the-money European call
option with maturity T = 1.
Plugging the above expression into (36) leads to
V˜t1l{τ≥t} = 1l{τ≥t}(B
rf
t )−1Vˆ (t, St) + EQ
[
1l{t<τ<T}
(
B
rf
τ
)−11l{τC<τI}LC(−(Vˆ (τ, Sτ )− Cτ−))+∣∣∣Gt]
− EQ
[
1l{t<τ<T}
(
B
rf
τ
)−11l{τI<τC}LI((Vˆ (τ, Sτ )− Cτ−))+∣∣∣Gt]
Multiplying both left and right hand side by Brft , we can rearrange the above expression and obtain
1l{τ≥t}
(
Vt − Vˆ (t, St)
)
=
EQ
[
1l{t<τ<T}
B
rf
t
B
rf
τ
(
1l{τC<τI}LC(−(Vˆ (τ, Sτ )− Cτ−))+ − 1l{τI<τC}LI((Vˆ (τ, Sτ )− Cτ−))+
)∣∣∣Gt],
which may be written as
XVAt = DVAt − CVAt,
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Figure 7: Top left: XVA as a function of rf for different α. Top right: Number of stock shares in the
replication strategy. Bottom left: Number of trader bond shares in the replication strategy. Bottom
right: Number of counterparty bond shares in the replication strategy. We set rD = 0.05, rc = 0.01,
σ = 0.2, LC = 0.5, LI = 0.5, hQI = 0.5 and h
Q
C = 0.5. The claim is an at-the-money European call
option with maturity T = 1.
where DVA and CVA are defined as
DVAt := EQ
[
1l{t<τ<T}1l{τI<τC}
B
rf
t
B
rf
τI
LI(Vˆ (τ, Sτ )− Cτ−)+
∣∣∣∣Gt]
CVAt := EQ
[
1l{t<τ<T}1l{τC<τI}
B
rf
t
B
rf
τC
LC(−(Vˆ (τ, Sτ )− Cτ−))+
∣∣∣∣Gt],
and represent, respectively, the debit and credit valuation adjustments, see also equation 3.4 in Capponi
(2013).
6 Conclusions
We have developed an arbitrage-free pricing framework for the total valuation adjustments (XVA) of a
European claim that the trader purchases or sells to his counterparty. Our analysis takes into account
funding spreads generated from the gap between borrowing and lending rates to the treasury, the
repo market, collateral servicing costs, and counterparty credit risk. The wealth process replicating
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payoffs of long and short positions in the traded claim can be characterized in terms of a nonlinear
BSDE with random terminal condition, associated with the closeout payment occurring when either
party defaults. We have derived the no-arbitrage band associated with the prices of buyer and seller’s
XVA, and shown that it collapses to a unique XVA price only in the absence of rate asymmetries.
Such a setting corresponds to a generalization of Piterbarg (2010)’s model for which we are able to
derive an explicit expression of the XVA prices. This expression decomposes the adjustment into four
contributing components: funding costs of the default and collateral-free position, CVA, DVA, and
servicing costs of the collateral procedure.
A BSDEs – Existence, Uniqueness, and Comparison of Solutions
We prove here some results about BSDEs needed in the main body of the paper. We keep the general
notation used throughout the paper and consider BSDEs of the form{
−dVt = f
(
ω, t, Vt, Zt, Z
I
t , Z
C
t
)
dt− Zt dWQt − ZIt d$I,Qt − ZCt d$C,Qt
Vτ = ζ1l{τ<T} + ϑ1l{τ=T}.
(37)
We call (f, ζ, ϑ) the data of the BSDE (37).
Assumption A.1. We will use the following assumption:
(A1) The terminal value satisfies ζ ∈ L2(Ω,Fτ ,Q) and ϑ ∈ L2(Ω,FT ,Q).
(A2) The generator f : Ω × [0, T ] × R4 → R is predictable and Lipschitz continuous in v z, zI and
zC , i.e. there is K > 0 such that for all (v1, z1, zI , zC), (v2, z2, zI , zC) ∈ R4 we have∣∣f(ω, t, v1, z1, zI1 , zC1 )− f(ω, t, v2, z2, zI2 , zC2 )∣∣ ≤ K(∣∣v1 − v2∣∣+ ∣∣z1 − z2∣∣+ ∣∣zI1 − zC2 ∣∣+ ∣∣zC1 − zC2 ∣∣)
almost surely almost everywhere.
(A3) EQ
[∫ T
0 |f(t, 0, 0, 0, 0)|2 dt
]
<∞.
(A4) There is a constant K > 0 such that for all (v, z, zI1 , zC1 ), (v, z, zI2 , zC2 ) ∈ R4 we have
f(ω, t, v, z, zI1 , zC)− f(ω, t, v, z, zI2 , zC) ≤ hQI
(
zI1 − zI2
)− +K(zI1 − zI2)+
and
f(ω, t, v, z, zI , zC1 )− f(ω, t, v, z, zI , zC2 ) ≤ hQC
(
zC1 − zC2
)− +K(zC1 − zC2 )+
almost surely almost everywhere.
To give an existence and uniqueness result for the BSDE (37), we introduce the following notation:
Let H2t denote the space of predictable processes Z : Ω× [0, t]→ R satisfying
EQ
[∫ t
0
|Zs|2 ds
]
<∞
and S2t the space of predictable processes Z : Ω× [0, t]→ R satisfying
EQ
[
sup
s∈[0,t]
|Zs|2
]
<∞.
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Theorem A.2. Assume that the data (f, ζ, ϑ) satisfy the conditions (A1)–(A3) of A.1. Then the
BSDE (37) admits a unique solution (V Q, ZQ, ZI,Q, ZC,Q) ∈ S2τ ×H2τ ×H2τ ×H2τ .
Proof. We start writing the BSDE (37) driven by Cox processes into an equivalent BSDE driven by
Lévy processes. Let N˜Pi (dt, dz), i ∈ {I, C}, be compensated Poisson random measures on (Ω,G,P)
with Lévy-compensators hPi dtδ1(dz). Define the filtration G′ := (G′t, t ≥ 0), where
G′t = σ
(
W Pu , N˜
P
I ([0, u], A), N˜PC([0, u], A);u ≤ t, A ∈ B(R)
)
.
Note that by setting
τ ′i = inf{t ≥ 0; N˜Pi ([0, t],R) = 1}, i ∈ {I, C},
and τ ′ = τ ′I ∧ τ ′C ∧ T , we can identify G′τ ′ with Gτ . Moreover we can define the change of measure Q′
via
dQ′
dP
∣∣∣∣
G′T
= e
rD−µ
σ
W PT−
(rD−µ)2
2σ2 T e(2rD−r
I−rC)T ∏
i∈{I,C}
∏
0≤s≤T
(
1 + r
i − rD
hPi
1l{
N˜Pi (s,R)6=N˜Pi (s−,R)
}) (38)
and note that Q′|G′
τ ′
= Q|Gτ . An application of Girsanov’s theorem gives that WQ
′
t = W P + µ−rDσ t,
t ≥ 0, is a Q′ Brownian motion. Moreover, the compensated Poisson random measures N˜Q′i (dt, dz),
i ∈ {I, C}, with Lévy-compensators hQ′i dtδ1(dz) are given via hQ
′
i = ri − rD + hPi .
We define the function f¯ : Ω× [0, T ]× R4 → R
f¯(ω, t, z, zI , zC) = f(ω, t, z, zI , zC)1l{t≤τ ′}
and set ϑ¯ := ζ1l{τ ′<T} + ϑ1l{τ ′=T} ∈ L2
(
Ω,G′T , P˜′
)
. By a straightforward extension of the results of
(Delong, 2013, Section 3.1) to two driving compensated random measures, the BSDE
V¯t = ϑ¯+
∫ T
t
f¯(ω, s, Z¯s, Z¯Is , Z¯Cs ) ds−
∫ T
t
Z¯s dW
Q′
s −
∫ T
t
∫
R
Z¯Is N˜
Q′
I (ds, dz)−
∫ T
t
∫
R
Z¯Cs N˜
Q′
C (ds, dz) (39)
admits a unique solution in S2T × H2T × H2T × H2T . Generalizing an argument by Pardoux (Pardoux,
1999, Proposition 2.6), this solution satisfies V¯t = V¯t∧τ ′ and Z¯t1l{t>τ ′} = Z¯It 1l{t>τ ′} = Z¯Ct 1l{t>τ ′} = 0.
Indeed, on the one hand we have (recall that τ ′ ≤ T by definition)
V¯τ ′ = ϑ¯−
∫ T
τ ′
Z¯s dW
Q′
s −
∫ T
τ ′
∫
R
Z¯Is N˜
Q′
I (ds, dz)−
∫ T
τ ′
∫
R
Z¯Cs N˜
Q′
C (ds, dz)
and therefore
V¯τ ′ = EQ˜
′[
ϑ¯ | G′τ ′
]
= ϑ¯.
On the other hand, applying Itô’s formula,
V¯ 2τ ′ = ϑ¯2 − 2
∫ T
τ ′
V¯sZ¯s dW
Q′
s − 2
∫ T
τ ′
∫
R
V¯sZ¯
I
s N˜
Q′
I (ds, dz)− 2
∫ T
τ ′
∫
R
V¯sZ¯
C
s N˜
Q′
C (ds, dz)−
∫ T
τ ′
Z¯2s ds
−
∑
τ ′<s≤T
(
V¯ 2s − V¯ 2s− − 2V¯s−
(
V¯s − V¯s−
))
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Thus, taking conditional expectations and noting that the stochastic integrals are all true martingales
as (V¯ , Z¯, Z¯I , Z¯C) ∈ S2T ×H2T ×H2T ×H2T , we get that
EQ
′
[∫ T
τ ′
Z¯2s ds+
∑
τ ′<s≤T
(
V¯s − V¯s−
)2 ∣∣∣G′τ ′] = 0
and therefore
∫ T
τ ′ Z¯
2
s ds = 0 a.s and V¯t1l{t>τ ′} = V¯τ ′1l{t>τ ′} a.s. Therefore, as f and f¯ agree up to τ ′ and
$i,Qt and N˜
Q′
i ([0, t],R), i ∈ {I, C}, agree on [0, τ ′], the unique solution to (39) restricted to {t ≤ τ ′}
is also a solution to (37). Moreover this solution is unique as every solution (V Q′ , ZQ′ , ZI,Q′ , ZC,Q′) of
(37) can be extended to a solution of (39) by setting V¯ ′s = V
Q′
s∧τ and Z¯ ′s = ZQ
′
s 1l{s≤τ}, Z¯
′I
s = ZI,Q
′
s 1l{s≤τ},
Z¯
′C
s = ZC,Q
′
s 1l{s≤τ}.
In a similar way, we can prove the following comparison theorem. Here, we only provide a sketch
of the proof.
Theorem A.3. Let (f1, ζ1, ϑ1) and (f2, ζ2, ϑ2) be data of BSDEs satisfying the assumptions (A1) –
(A4) of A.1 and such that f1(t, v, z, zI , zC) ≥ f2(t, v, z, zI , zC) for all (t, v, z, zI , zC) ∈ [0, T ] × R4,
ζ1 ≥ ζ2 a.s. and ϑ1 ≥ ϑ2 a.s. Then V 1t∧τ ≥ V 2t∧τ a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Moreover, if V 1t0∧τ = V 2t0∧τ a.s.
for some t0 ∈ [0, T ], then V 1t∧τ = V 2t∧τ a.s for all t ∈ [t0, T ].
Proof. The proof works similar to the one given above. We consider first the BSDEs with drivers
f¯j(ω, t, z, zI , zC) = fj(ω, t, z, zI , zC)1l{t≤τ}, j ∈ {1, 2}, and driven by compensated Poisson random
measures N˜Q
′
i , i ∈ {I, C}. We can thus invoke the comparison theorem (Delong, 2013, Theorem 3.2.2).
Restricting ourselves to {t ≤ τ ′} (where the Poisson randommeasures agree with the martingales$i,Q),
we get the result.
We next make the following observation.
Remark A.4. Similar to Proposition 4.1.1 in Delong (2013) we know that the value process up to
default is Markovian. Moreover, on the set {t < τ} we have that $i,Qt = −hQi t for i ∈ {I, C}.
Thus we can reduce it to the state variables t and St. Therefore we can find a measurable function
v¯ : [0, T ]× R>0 → R such that v¯(t, St) = Vt1l{τ>t}.
The following theorem shows how the function v¯ from Remark A.4 can be used to find the hedging
strategies. Once noting that the law of St is absolutely continuous, the proof of the theorem becomes
analogous to the proof of Theorem 4.1.4 in Delong (2013) and will be omitted.
Theorem A.5. Let (f, θτ (Vˆ (τ, Sτ )), Vˆ (T, ST )) be data of BSDEs satisfying the assumptions (A1) –
(A4) of A.1. Additionally, let the function v¯(t, St) = Vt1l{τ>t} be defined as in Remark A.4. Then, on
the set {t < τ} we have that
Zt = σStv¯S(t, St),
Zit = θi(Vˆ (t, St))− v¯(t, St), i ∈ {I, C}.
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